



ORIGINAL PAPER

The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 and the Romanian Intervention. A Historiographical Analysis

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Abstract

The article reveals the moment and the implications of the Romanian intervention in Hungary, in 1919, after the proclamation of the Soviet Hungarian Republic, under the leadership of Bela Kun, an advocate and journalist with Jewish-Hungarian origin, born in 1886, at Cehu Silvaniei, then in Austria-Hungary, today in Romania. The issue was presented in the historiography with multiple senses. Romanian intervention was seen by the contemporaries as a defensive action of Romania to impose the decisions of December 1-st 1918 of Alba Iulia. Hungarian republican troops refused to retreat according to the international agreements on the Franchet D(Esperey Line. After Bela Kun seized power as a Bolshevik internationalist leader, on March, 21 1919, the great powers had seen an immediate danger for extending the Communism from Soviet Russia which was in the Civil War. For Romania, the attitude of Bela Kun was seen as a threat regarding Transylvania, because Bela Kun refused to admit the historical rights of Romania and declared war on Romania, on April 16, 1919. Romania succeeded to have Banat under complete Romanian administration on August 3, 1919, when Romanian troops entered in Timisoara. Romanian campaign in Hungary, started on passing Tisa on July 24 1919, had a double asset, as the researchers considered: on the main side, a communist government in Central Europe could be dismissed, on the other side; Romania could have more rights when the Treaty with Hungary will be signed. On August 4, 1919, Romanian Army entered in Budapest. After 1989, the Romanian Campaign from 1919 was seen as the first successfully anti-communist military action in Europe after the collapse of the democratic forces help against Russian Bolsheviks in 1921. Hungarian communists and also Romanian communists who respected Moscow political line considered the Romanian campaign as an “imperialist aggression”.

Keywords: *Austria-Hungary dissolution; Bela Kun; Romanian Army intervention; Soviet Republic of Hungary; Communist revolution; Bolshevik agitations.*

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The moment of the victorious campaign of Romania in Hungary, in 1919, was treated differently in historiography. Regardless the pros and cons, this military intervention was justified by the international situation of the moment. Romania interfered due to the fact that it was directly threatened by Bela Kun, through his declarations and propaganda. The regime of Bela Kun was not one based on realism, this being the reason for not finding support, not even in his own country. Moscow used the failure of Bela Kun to show that where there is no consistency, “the class enemy” cannot be defeated. Romania acted in agreement with the allied powers. There was tried the accreditation of the idea that Romania would have tried to support the extremist right regime of Miklos Horthy, because it joined the fascist and Nazi ideology in the last decade of the inter-war period, after the European ascension of the Nazi Germany.

Romania lost territories in the summer of 1940, because of the incapacity displayed by the generation of politicians after the Great Union, who did not know how to create an efficient diplomacy, as that of their predecessors who had accomplished the Union and the Independence from the 19th century. Moreover, neither were the states as France or Great Britain too interested in having a decisive policy in the Balkans, allowing the Soviet Russia, Germany and Italy to launch themselves in a revisionist and revanchist policy, on the background of the appeasement towards Germany.

Bela Kun, Roza Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht were the exponents of a type of revolutionary politicians that almost had not overcome the idea of anarchism. They were regarded by the communist leaders from Moscow as pawns of an experiment that was announcing the instauration of a new regime in Europe and in the rest of the world. The fact that Bela Kun and other communist leaders ended executed by Stalin, showed that their failure transformed them in the “guilty-by-default” ones, because the communist regime preferred the execution of the scapegoats instead of analysing its own weaknesses, this representing, in the communist vision, a kind of betrayal of the class ideology.

Introduction

Last year, there was registered the passing of a century from the moment the Romanian Army put an end to the Bolshevik regime of Bela Kun. The event was considered by the Romanian historiography, as expected, a necessary victory that consecrated the historic right of Romania on Transylvania, regulated and acknowledged officially through the Treaty of Trianon from the 4th of June 1920. The Hungarians have regarded this action as the compelling, coming from the Romanian side, of the agreements from the Peace Conferences of Paris, which were being carried out, meaning that, in the moment of the 1919 campaign, the Romanian Army entered where it did not have the right to do it, nonetheless. Yet, from the point of view of the treaties, in 1919, Romania had not reached an agreement with Hungary, where the legitimate government, installed after the collapse of the dualist regime, had been removed by the Bolshevik. It goes without saying that, both the legitimate government, circumstantial pro-Entente, and the revolutionary, by definition Bolshevik, had their plans on addressing Transylvania, and they were against the legitimate aspirations of Romania.

Moreover, the Bolshevik regime from Budapest had been installed, under the circumstances that were displaying the fact that the occidental democratic states were involved in the Civil War from Russia, where they were supporting the forces of Mensheviks and the Esers against the Red Army, made of the Bolsheviks grouped

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around Lenin and Trotsky. Russia had left World War I in 1918 and was not participating to the Peace Conference. The Bolshevik government from Budapest had removed the government that had to participate to the Peace Conferences, thus, the crisis from Budapest could not be covered by the force of the international treaties. The occidental states did not have a legal foundation to interfere, owing to the fact that they not directly affected by the previous events from Budapest. Poland and Czechoslovakia became states, thus, it was difficult for these entities to intervene. Romania was an independent state in full process of accomplishing its territorial unification. This precise aspect was used by Ionel Brătianu, who was participating to some fearsome negotiations with the Peace Instance from Paris. Ionel Brătianu, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and other people knew they had a leverage and it was called the *nolens-volens* circumstance, Romania was a winning state after it had declared war to the Central Powers on the 10th of November 1918, a day before the Armistice of Compiègne.

The strategical componence of the campaign was not considered in detail. Nor was the calendar evolution of the events insisted upon, due to the fact that the purpose of the present article was not to do it. The article intends the historiographic analysis of an event that took place a little over a century ago, along with its consequences.

The force of the law or the law of the force?

Nevertheless, what was the movement of Bela Kun representing and what was the signification of a Bolshevik republic in the Central Europe? It should not be forgotten that, in Germany, the “Spartacus League” movement generated a revolution in November 1918, the hostilities lasting until 1919. Hungary had also started to move on the same route, while the Bolsheviks, in Russia, were continuing against “the white” and their western allies successfully.

Thus, the Bolshevik danger from Russia had the potential of extending, due to the fact that Trotsky was planning a world revolution, in which the workers would live without the states. Basically, the situation from Hungary was similar to the case when the danger should be removed using a side participant. Ionel Brătianu said that when he participated to the Council of the Allies that “*Romania was the first ally state to fight the Bolsheviks*” (Spector, 1995: 107).

The historians that accuse Romania of having used the “law of force” in 1919 pretend to not see the fact that the winning states could not interfere through “the force of law”, and Romania was the only one capable of doing it, precisely because it was the only one menaced by the Bolshevik republic from Budapest. Romania had observed the recommendations of not going beyond the Franchet d’Esperey line, for the Hungarian troops of the legitimate government to retreat, even if the Assembly of Alba Iulia had offered the *de facto* leadership of Transylvania to a Romanian Ruling Council (Constantinescu, 1971: 301; Spector, 1995: 108, 109), which had to make a peaceful transition of the power, from the former dualist authorities to the Romanian ones.

After the intervention of the Romanian Army, the Allies also took a stand, a fact that justifies the Romanian action. It is a fact acknowledged by Rado Șandor too, the well-known Soviet spy from World War II, himself a Hungarian Bolshevik activist, under the regime of Bela Kun, then the Soviet spy, working under the pseudonyms “Dora” and “Albert”. This is what Rado Șandor was remembering about the intervention of the Romanian Army: “*The bourgeoisie armies unleashed the offensive against the Hungarian Republic of the Councils, few weeks after it had been constituted. The*

intervention had begun. The first troops that started to move were the ones from Transylvania, the troops of the estate-owning Romania. Starting from Yugoslavia, the French occupied the cities next to the border; then, the Czechoslovakian army, a recently constituted bourgeoisie state, began the attack, also under the French (and Italian) command” (Rado, 1974: 40).

The situation from Budapest, in 1919, seen from historiographic perspective

There are Hungarian historians, as Albert Kaas and Fedor de Lazarovics, who show that the Bolshevik regime from Budapest “had been dressed in nationalist clothing”, a circumstantial one, (which meant that Bela Kun would not have tolerated the belonging of Transylvania to Romania), dreaming on a world revolution. Nonetheless, this thesis of the world revolution was menacing Romania directly, which Buharin was later considering “an imperialist state and the dungeon of the peoples”. Thus, during the entire month of April in 1919, it had become obvious the fact that the government from Budapest, owing to “the situation”, was moving on to military preparation: “*the situation was requiring the creation of an army, and, for this purpose, the communists had to be dressed in nationalist clothing, which they abandoned the moment they did not need it anymore*” (Kaas & Lazarovics, 1931: 171).

The violent change of the regime from Budapest, with a Bolshevik one, illegitimate, was representing a potential danger for Europe. The extreme-right movements were still in an incipient phase, because Europe was recovering after the war, and, until the Great Depression from 1929, there was a decade more to go. Romania was directly menaced by the change from Budapest. The historian Ioan Scurtu affirms that: “*The communist government from Budapest – acting by mutual consent with the Bolshevik one from Moscow – refused to retreat its troops from Transylvania and attacked the Romania army, from Apuseni mountains*” (Scurtu, 2007: 60).

The historian from Oradea, Gabriel Moisa, referring to the Bolshevik actions from Bihor County, notes the manner in which they were counteracted by the Romanian general Gheorghe Mărdărescu: “*On the 12th of June 1919, the commander of the troops from Transylvania, general Gheorghe Mărdărescu, was drawing the attention to the Police department from the city of Oradea, that, in the city, there is, most likely, a group of people who were adhering to the communist ideas that spread fake information about the Romanian army and the formation of the Romanian administration, information that has an obvious impact on the Magyar and Jewish population from that city. General Mărdărescu requested that the group to be identified, arrested and sent before the Martial Court. A week later, the Police was answering general Mărdărescu, underlining that the individuals are the same that the police had arrested repeatedly in the past, but the Commandant’s Office had always sent them free. The solution offered by the police department of the city for stopping the communist propaganda was their arresting and hospitalisation*” (Moisa, 2016: 42).

“The Spanish influenza”, called in this manner because only the Spanish press was mentioning it (Spain was not involved in the world war) led to the death of 100 million people, which was basically the same number of victims that the war had produced on the battle fields.

In Europe, “the roaring twenties” were beginning, the world was starting to feel the taste of peace. There had been created a manpower void, and the employers were trying to take advantage of it, while the workers, influenced by the socialist and

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communist manner of thinking, had become more active, especially due to the fact that they were coming from the front, having military training and being influenced by the military organisation. Germany, Italy, Spain were starting to experience the wave of right nationalism, provoked by the economic shortcomings that increased after the beginning of the Great Depression (1929-1933).

Thus, Romania was the only one able to act through the “force of law” and Ionel Brătianu, along with the leaders of the winning powers, was aware of. Ionel Brătianu declared at Sibiu, in 1919, that *“today, the Romanian soldiers (...) have protected the European civilisation against the destructive wave of Bolshevism”* (Spector, 1995: 208). Although some historians try to minimise the role of the Bolshevik danger for Romania, they also acknowledge that Bela Kun was popular amongst the Romanian socialist and Bolshevik sympathisers from Transylvania (Mireanu, 2019:24). Keith Hitchins noted that the Romanian Socialist Party from Hungary was affirming that Romania was a reactionary state and it was asking the Romanian peasants, in 1918, to oppose against the Union with Romania (Hitchins, 1983: 221). In 1919, the same party qualified the actions of Romania as *“a criminal act, set in motion by an imperialist army”* (Hitchins, 1983: 221).

Gabriel Moisa studied the archives from Bihor and notes the manner in which the followers of Bela Kun were endangering the order installed by the Romanian authorities, before the beginning of the military action of Romania against the regime of Bela Kun: *“On the 13th of June 1919, a new note coming from the Commandment of the Romanian troops from Transylvania, sent to the Commandment’s Office, and from there to the Police Department from Oradea, was asking him to stop the Bolshevik propaganda through films. At the city cinemas, there were still shown films from the Bolshevik period. Any cinematographic show was forbidden until it would obtain the agreement of the 4th Division of Oradea, for demonstrating the film. The note was sent as a consequence of the fact that there was information according to which the Hungarian Bolsheviks were preparing an intense Bolshevik propaganda through “cinematographic films” that they would send from Budapest. The most important reason was offered by the apparition, in a magazine from Budapest called Köpes Mozvslag (The world of films) of an article, The Literature of the Proletarian Films, in which there were mentioned the new films that would replace the old capitalism films from the cinemas”* (Moisa, 2016: 42).

The propaganda of Bela Kun was done inclusively through the distribution of Bolshevik works or manifestos:

“There was also insisted on an increases attention given to other types of Bolshevik propaganda, written or of any other nature. There was important a series of leaflets published at Moscow in Romanian, under the supervision of a communist committee led by Alexandru Nicolau. Among them there was: A Year of Revolution, author Alexandru Nicolau, Whose Land Is This, author Bela Kun, The Communist Platform, author Bucko, The Constitution, author Lenin, The Red Army, author Trotsky. This group also printed manifestos in the Romanian language, which could be thrown from a plane by the communist power from Budapest. The third point of the note from the 13th of June 1919 was requesting an increase attention of the police from Oradea for the eventual identification of three members of the communist group from Kiev, led by Cristian Rakovsky, who could have been hiding in Oradea since the times of the Bolshevik regime” (Moisa, 2016: 42)

In the communist period, the subject of the Romanian military section, entirely justified in 1919, was completely passed over in silence. In the Romanian communist historiography, there was mentioned: *“The revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, the consolidation of the working class movement (...) contributed to the tightening of the Romanian, German, Magyar, and other nationality workers brotherhood relation, in their fight against the reactionary regime (...) in order to obtain equal rights for all, regardless their nationality”* (Constantinescu, 1971: 304).”

In *The History of the Romanians* treaties, the historians Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu and Constantin Botoran assert that General Bandholtz, sent by the allies, misappropriated the truth on the Romanian troops and their actions from Hungary, in order to appear agreeable before the Magyar diaspora from the USA:

“Not only did the Romanian troops, present in Hungary, choose to not set about to useless acts of repercussion or revenge, but they got involved, without any reservation, in the effort of re-establish the situation (...). Considering all this decent type of behaviour, also evidenced by the Magyar authorities, Romania had to endure the evident hostile attitude of some of the diplomats (...). By distorting the truth (...), in the wish of pleasing the Hungarian friends, General Bandholtz proved to be dishonest to his comrades...” (Botoran&Dobrinescu, 2003: 19).

Today, there are historians considering that useless, because it would have encouraged the social inequity, and did not produce beneficial social transformations. The author excludes completely the just idea of Romania defending its national interest in this conflict: *“The war between Romanian and Hungary was not a heroic expedition for the saving of the country. It was not a crusade against the former oppressors who did not acknowledge the ancestral national rights of the Romanians. It was neither an operation to save Hungary and Europe from the claws of a despotic and criminal regime. It was a war rather similar to the ones from the past century: a clash between martial costly machines, led by generals that were living a luxurious life, and operated by soldiers who barely had any food. It was a war in which the politicians were inciting people to kill each other for abstract and poetically enounced ideals, who served only the further enriching of the already rich and to further ruin the already poor. It was a war that did not improve at all the social condition of those who fought it, but, on the other hand, made them hate each other. And finally, it was a war in which the enemy was permanently transformed into the “absolute evil”, which had to be humiliated and destroyed (...). And, presumably, through such political friendships, over a hundred years from now, we would celebrate something else than an ineffective war”* (Mireanu, 2019:39).

Bela Kun and the temptation of a new “Anabasis”

We chose the syntagma of the subtitle, in order to illustrate, as accurate as possible, the actions of Bela Kun. Similar to *“The Expedition of the 10,000”* in the Antiquity, in which the Greek had to retreat from the northern Mesopotamia towards the Black Sea by the force of hazard, the Bolshevik Bela Kun chose to generate the revolutionary movement without any real support, because in Russia, the Civil War was continuing and the regime from the Soviet Russia could not offer him any support (Hajdu, 1979: 145). Bela Kun was a Trotsky supporter, an internationalist, and the revolutionary internationalism did not have any visibility in the concept expressed by the regime from Moscow, in the form that Trosky was dreaming of. Bela Kun was an opportunist. He enlisted as a volunteer, as a non-commissioned officer (unterofizier) in

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the Austro-Hungarian Army from Cluj. He was sent to Galicia, where he distinguished himself on the front, becoming an officer. Being taken prisoner by the Russians, confined in the Camp from Tomsk, he adhered to the Bolshevik ideas, trying to take advantage, for his personal interest, on the Bolshevik's money. It was his ambitious nature and his opportunism that assured him, in Lenin's view, the quality of clandestine activist for Hungary, being sent there, although it was well known the fact that he took illegal possession of money belonging to the Communist Party, a deed for which he could have been executed without a trial.

On the 2nd of August 1919, Bela Kun was already in an armoured train towards Vienna, where, along with his similar-ideas comrades stayed in a camp, from where he was expelled in the Soviet Russia, in July 1920, when Austria exchanged prisoners with Russia. Then, along Bela Kun, there were expelled 414 communists.

In his last speech delivered in Hungary, Bela Kun was expressing his disappointment towards the attitude of the Magyar proletariat, who would have supposedly betrayed themselves: *"The Hungarian proletariat betrayed not their leaders but itself. [...] If there had been, in Hungary, a proletariat with the consciousness of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it would not collapse in this way [...] I would have liked to see the proletariat fighting on the barricades declaring that it would rather die than give up power. [...] The proletariat which continued to shout in factories, 'Down with the dictatorship of the proletariat', will be even less satisfied with any future government"* (Tokes, 1967: 112).

There was considered that the regime of Bela Kun fell not only because of the external intervention, but also due to the internal weaknesses of the regime. Obviously, a regime falls, primarily, when it is weak internally, nonetheless, there is a certitude saying that the foreign intervention had a decisive role, contrary to what the Italian diplomat says: *"Whereas the "dictatorship of the proletariat" could be proclaimed as a result of international political events which weighed heavily on the whole affair, the fall of "the Republic of Councils" did not occur because of the intervention of the reactionary circles of the Entente or of the "White" Hungarian counter-revolution (as a Communist legend maintains and is still affirmed by some partisan historians), but because of its inherent weaknesses, the consequence of its internal, social and economic policies"* (Indelicato, 2017).

Bela Kun remained a misfit. After he became member of the Comintern, he received the Soviet citizenship and the quality of member of the Communist Party, Bela Kun decided to continue his illusory international plans. In the universal historiography, there was considered that Bela Kun wanted that *"the European proletariat to prevent the attack against Hungary by the bourgeoisie from the origin country, and, thus, to extend the basis of the social revolution in Europe"*, as the historian Alfred Low asserts (Low, 1971: 138).

An Italian article reads that Bela Kun had intended, idealistically, to create at Budapest what the Bolsheviks had succeeded at Moscow:

"Soon after that Béla Kun went back to Hungary, where his mission and firm intention was to repeat the feat that had been accomplished by the Bolsheviks in Russia. He was sure that, armed with "Marxist science" and following the example of Lenin, he would seize power, not for himself but for the whole proletariat. The same day of his return to Budapest, the Republic was proclaimed (...). At that time, he did not yet have a strong Communist Party behind him. But he did not see that as a problem: in November of the previous year Lenin himself could not rely on a large party either, and yet he had

proved that to take power one did not need great battalions, just a group of decided men.

The party Kun had founded with few companions in Russia the previous March was officially relaunched eight days after his return to Budapest. The real difficulty consisted, if anything, in the numerical strength of the Socialists” (Indelicato, 2017).

As for his capacity of delivering speeches, historian Rudolf Tokes notes that, for the many, Bela Kun, was an exponent of the Marxism: *“Yesterday I heard Kun speak... it was an audacious, hateful, enthusiastic oratory. [...] He knows his audience and rules over them... Factory workers long at odds with the Social Democratic Party leaders, young intellectuals, teachers, doctors, lawyers, clerks who came to his room... meet Kun and Marxism”* (Tokes, 1967: 111,112).

Leo Trotsky, would declare, after the failure of the Hungarian Republic of the Councils, in a speech made in the Common Meeting of the Soviet from Moscow with the Syndicate Delegations, on the 26th of August 1919: *“The Soviet Hungary, installed over a 78 kilometres width, has fallen only temporary. But what does the area of 78 kilometres around Budapest signify, compared to the thousands of kilometres that we took for the Soviet Russia. To our comrades from Hungary, we say: wait, brothers, wait! Your patience shall be rewarded!”*

Later on, Bela Kun received the task or organising a putsch in the central Germany, where the mine workers were dissatisfied, but the putsch from the 27th of March 1921 was an equally painful failure, which led to Lenin, the leader of the Soviet Russia, labelling him as “politic irresponsible person”.

Finally, after the purge of Trotsky, Bela Kun was arrested as a Trotsky adept, along with his family. He was executed in a working camp (from the Soviet Gulag), on the 29th of August 1938.

He was rehabilitated by Janos Kadar, after the Soviet intervention from 1956, against the Magyar Revolution led by Imre Nagy, because the Soviet regime needed at least a feeble connection between the Magyar activists and the Soviet ones. Yet, the truth about the death of Bela Kun was officially known after 1991, when the Soviet Union fell.

The “Bela Kun” episode and the faith of Romania in 1921-1958 period

There ought to be analysed the avatars of the Romanian intervention from 1919, in Transylvania, in the inter-war period. The Magyar communist activists did not forget the Romanian intervention from 1919, preserving a permanent desire of revenge. Unsurprisingly, Romania had the faith of the state that helped and its help was forgotten. The intervention of Romania helped the regime of Miklos Horthy to seize power and it is well-known that Horthy received a “slice of Transylvania”, after the Vienna Award. The Horthyst atrocities from the North-Western Ardeal terrified the world after the 30th of August 1940.

If it is to return to year 1921, the moment when the Communist Party from Romania (PCdR) appeared, banished in April 1924, it becomes obvious that Bela Kun used his entire influence in nurturing the Magyar irredentism, along with the appointing in PCdR’s top positions some communists who were not Romanians. The only Romanian leader was Gheorghe Cristescu-Plăpumarul (in the period 1921-1924), after which period the leadership of the Romanian communists was taken by the Magyar Elek Köblös, former member in the Red Guards from Hungary, in 1919, a carpenter born near

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Tirgu-Mureş, (Tănase, 2016: 121), between 1924 and 1927. Vitali Holostenko followed, an Ukrainian communist activist, who led between activist 1927 and 1931 (Frunză: 1990, 50), Alexander Ştefanski (a Polish communist from Warsaw, who led PCdR between 1931-1936), Boris Ştefanov (a Bulgarian ethnic from Dobruja, between 1934-1940), Istvan Foriş (1940-1944, a Magyar ethnic, born in Romania). Thus, during the entire period of illegality, PCdR was led by communist who did not have Romanian origins.

After the 25th of October 1944 and until the 6th of March 1945, the North-Western Ardeal was administrated military by the Red Army, the returning to Romania being possible after the installation, on the 6th of March 1945 of Dr. Petru Groza Government.

The Magyar communists wanted to get Transylvania as compensation for the attitude Romania had displayed towards Hungary, in 1919, only that Stalin reproached them that the Magyars did not have an act similar to that from the 23rd of August 1944, that is, the communist Magyars had not overthrown the Horthy regime by force, as the Romanian had done with Ion Antonescu. Stalin was content with the founding, in 1952, of the Magyar Autonomous Region, as factor for pressing the Romanians.

Stalin hated Bela Kun for being a Trotskyist. The PCdR leaders who did not have Romanian origins - Vitali Holostenko, Elek Köblös, Alexander Ştefanski ended executed because they were Trotskyists, Istvan Foriş was eliminated from the nucleus formed around Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej. Boris Ştefanov experienced a narrow escape, in 1940, after helping Gheorghe Dimitrov. Gheorghe Cristescu, the first Romanian communist leader of PCdR died in 1973.

In 1956, the Popular Romania supported the Soviet intervention in Hungary (in secret, many remembered the Romanian campaign from 1919), and Imre Nagy was arrested and confined at Snagov, in Romania, after he had sought refuge at the headquarters of the Yugoslavian Embassy from Bucharest, along with 38 communist Magyar activists and he was abducted by KGB. Imre Nagy was executed on the 16th of June 1958, in Hungary.

The Red Army retreated from Romania in 1958, and the Magyar Autonomous Mureş Region, which represented the reorganisation in 1960 of the Magyar Autonomous Region was abolished once with all the other regions in 1968.

Conclusions

What would have the faith of Romania looked like, if Bela Kun had renounced his internationalist vision and had abandoned the Trotskyist side of the Soviet ideology? It will remain an enigma, yet, we can notice that Bela Kun did not enjoy sympathy from the Trotskyist side either, and even less in the Stalinist group of the Moscow regime. The epuration of Leo Trotsky, through his exile at Alma Ata, then in Occident, and, finally, in Mexico, meant the removal of the group made of Zinoiev, Kamenev, Buharin, faithful to Lenin, and especially to Trotsky. Stalin had been chosen by Trotsky to become general secretary of the Communist Party because he was “*a hard-working mountaineer, resilient as a mule on the mountainous steep paths*”. Apparently, his function was an irrelevant one, but Stalin, who had been a People’s Commissary for Nationalities, knew how to bring everything to his own advantage.

Evidently, Bela Kun was a lawyer and a journalist with Marxist views, and Stalin was a former Orthodox seminary-school student, who had become a professional revolutionist. The unpardonable mistakes of Bela Kun affected his image before Lenin

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and, consequently, before Stalin. Except for Gheorghe Cristescu-Plăpumaru and Boris Ștefanov, all the PCdR leaders were executed by Trotskyists.

Stalin rejected the Trotskyist internationalism. He considered useful to transform the Soviet Union into a force, in order to exercise the political influence through satellite governments. Stalin explained to Milovan Djilas that wherever the army of a state would go, there could be installed a political system, similar to that of the state that sent the army. Stalin knew that he would need the help of the capitalist powers, in the eventuality of a major conflict, this being the reason for not wishing to affect their integrity by exporting revolutions. It did not mean that he avoided initiating a vast espionage web in these states, trying to find their secrets. After World War II, Stalin gained half of Europe, imposing communist regimes. Later, communist regimes were also installed in states from Africa, Asia, Middle East, Latin America. The Trotskyism took the final strike after the assassination of Trotsky in Mexico, in 1940.

The attitude of Romania from the summer of 1919 brought it the right to own the control over the situation, when signing the Treaty of Trianon, on the 4th of June 1920, when Hungary had to acknowledge the union of Transylvania with Romania.

Little over a century after this campaign, the attitude of Romania as confronted to the regime imposed by Bela Kun is entirely justified. Bela Kun, menacing the integrity of the Romanian state, had initiated subversive actions against the natural order. Bela Kun followed without reasoning the indications from Moscow. The fact that Romania suffered more from the actions initiated by Miklos Horthy than from those of the Magyar communists generated the situation in which Bela Kun lost his credibility before his supporters from Moscow. The failure from Germany showed that Bela Kun was a reality disconnected politician. It was the worth of Ionel Brătianu, and the Romanian Army too, that unravelled the portray of an idealist irredentist, Bela Kun the Trotskyist communist, a politician lacking the sense of reality, but dangerous for his country, Hungary, too, not only for Romania.

Perhaps that it was exactly his incapacity to leave a consistent mark in the history of the world communism made Romania unable to bear even greater difficulties from Moscow, although there were voices that would punish Romania for removing him, in the inter-war period, and also after 1947, when the communism installed completely in the half East of Europe.

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